This paper presents an analysis of the stimulants and consequences of money demand dynamics. By assuming that household's money holdings and consumption preferences are not separable, we demonstrate that the interestelasticity of demand for money is a function of the household's preference to hold real balances, the extent to which these preferences are not separable in consumption and real balances, and trend in ‡ation. An empirical study of U.S. data revealed that there was a gradual fall in the interest elasticity of money demand of approximately one-third during the 1970s due to high trend in ‡ation. A further decline in the interest-elasticity of the demand for money was observed in the 1980s due to the changing household preferences that emerged in response to …nancial innovation. These developments led to a reduction in the welfare cost of in ‡ation that subsequently explains the rise in monetary neutrality observed in the data.
Introduction
Since the 1980s, the long-standing empirical theories that connect several alternative monetary aggregates to movements in prices and interest rates have gradually evolved (Friedman and Kuttner, 1992) . Speci…cally, the application of the framework proposed by Lucas (2000) led Ireland (2009) to the detection of important changes in the interest semi-elasticity of money demand in the period following the 1980s. For many decades, the monetary policy theory literature was focused on the implications of the interest-elasticity of money demand and the role this played in determining the e¤ectiveness of monetary policies (Tobin, 1956; Laumas and Laumas, 1969; Vernon, 1977) . King (1999) and Friedman (1999) con…rmed the limited e¤ectiveness of monetary policy as a consequence of a moneyless economy while the …ndings of Woodford (2000 Woodford ( , 2003 Woodford ( , 2008 contradicted this result.
Most of the debate in this domain focused on the interest semi-elasticity of money demand, which is essentially concerned with monetary neutrality (Lucas, 1996) . As this long and lively debate demonstrated, the extent to which money can in ‡uence the interest rate and welfare cost of in ‡ation could change over time. In this paper, we document and assess the causes and macroeconomic consequences of the time-varying relationship between interest rates and money. We derive a general micro-founded interpretation of the familiar log-linear money demand relationship described in Lucas (2000) , which is aligned with that employed by Ireland (2009) . The interest semi-elasticity of money demand is described as a function of the household's preferences to hold real balances and substitute consumption and real balances, steady-state gross in ‡ation, and interest rates. Therefore, the expression enables us to capture the structural channels that may have stimulated the changes in the money demand observed in the empirical literature.
An application of such a micro-founded money demand framework allows the quanti…cation of the welfare cost of in ‡ation by linking it with the structural parameters that drive the interest semi-elasticity of money demand. The subsequent framework can pin down the parameters of interest in this equation, both through examining the …rst moments in the data and direct estimation.
Our empirical estimation of the money demand equation based on the quarterly U.S. data covering the period 1959 to 2008 reveals that there was a decline in the interest semi-elasticity of money demand and a subsequent fall in the welfare cost of in ‡ation during this period. The benchmark results con…rm the analysis o¤ered by Ireland (2009) , who found a semi-elasticity below 2 as well as a smaller welfare cost estimate of modest departures from Friedman's zero nominal interest rate rule for the optimum quantity of money during the post-1980s era.
Allowing for time variation in the money demand function using recursive estimates reveals a gradual fall in the interest elasticity of money demand of approximately one-third during the 1970s due to both trend in ‡ation and an increase in interest rates. A further decline in the interest-elasticity of the demand for money was observed in the 1980s due to the changing household preferences that emerged in response to …nancial innovation. The latter in ‡uenced the household's preferences to hold real balances and their willingness to substitute real balances and consumption. In combination, our results suggest that the entire shift in money demand could be attributed to the evolution of trend in ‡ation, interest rates, and changes in the household's preferences, thereby explaining the results found in Ireland (2009) and Lucas (2000) .
These developments led to a reduction in the welfare cost of in ‡ation that subsequently explains the rise in monetary neutrality observed in the data. Our time-varying estimates of money demand show that the welfare cost of 10 percent in ‡ation decreased from 0.92 percent of income in the 1960s to under 0.20 percent of income in the 1990s. 1 Since household's preferences and trend in ‡ation enter the IS equation through various structural parameters, changes in these parameters may have broader macroeconomic consequences. A comparison of the reactions of output to an interest rate shock between pre-1979 and post-1980s periods based on a vector autoregression (VAR) indicates that the impact elasticity of monetary policy roughly halved. An interest rate shock had approximately 35% less impact on output in 1980 than it did during the pre-1979 period. The fall in the household's preferences to hold real balances and substitute between consumption and real balances altered key parameters in the IS curve. Therefore, changes that a¤ect the traditional money demand relationships may also explain a proportion of the rise in monetary neutrality observed in the data.
This paper adds to the existing debate in multiple ways. It provides a microfounded interpretation of the interest semi-elasticity of money demand and the welfare cost of in ‡ation. This extends the work of many scholars (Cagan, 1956; Lucas, 1981; Meltzer, 1963; Sidrauski, 1967; Fischer, 1981; Cooley and Hansen, 1989; Dotsey and Ireland, 1996; Lucas, 2000; Ireland, 2009; Miller et al., 2019) . The identi…cation of the changes in the semi-elasticity and the welfare cost can explain the contrasting welfare estimates presented in the existing literature (Broaddus and Goodfriend, 1984; Reynard, 2004; Ireland, 2009; Lucas and Nicolini, 2015) . Belongia and Ireland (2019) proposed alternative monetary measures that preserve these long-standing relationships and add to the theoretical explanations, such as those based on Baumol-Tobin style inventory-theoretic models of money (Attanasio et al., 2002; Alvarez and Lippi, 2009 ), or insurance against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (Berentsen et al., 2015) , all of which equate changes in household behavior to the breakdown in money demand relationships.
The changing household's substitution preferences between consumption and real balances and the corresponding empirical results extend the existing literature on estimates of real balances through constant elasticity of substitution (CES) money-in-the-utility function (MIUF) speci…cation (Holman, 1998; Finn et al., 1990; Poterba and Rotemberg, 1987; Fourçans, 2012, 2017) . While Ireland (2004) and Woodford (2003) found that the weight of real balances was of a negligible size, our time-varying estimation highlights how this weight was larger during the 1960s and 1970s before falling to zero from the mid-1980s onwards. Broadly 1 For example, Ireland (2009) found a welfare cost for a 10% in ‡ation rate of less than 0.25% of income. Lucas (2000) found a welfare cost for 10% in ‡ation of just over 1.8% income. Fischer (1981) found a welfare cost for 10% in ‡ation between 0.2% and 0.3% income. Cooley and Hansen (1989) found that a welfare cost of 10% in ‡ation is about 0.4% of GDP using a cash-in-advance version of the business cycle model. Miller et al. (2019) found a welfare cost for 10% in ‡ation of just over average 0.27% income. speaking, since real balances enter directly in the dynamic IS, determining in ‡ation and output dynamics through this channel may be relevant during this period, and this …nding complements that of Castelnuovo (2012) and Benchimol and Fourçans (2017) . This e¤ect is combined by a higher elasticity of substitution between consumption and real balances, implying that household's preferences are not fully separable in either time period.
The …ndings also explain the shifts in the welfare cost of in ‡ation and connect both the household behavior and changes in the U.S. macroeconomic dynamics through the money demand function. The time-varying aspect of the semi-elasticity contributes to the money demand instability (Khan, 1974; Judd and Scadding, 1982; Tesfatsion and Veitch, 1990; Hafer and Jansen, 1991; Miller, 1991; Lütkepohl, 1993; Chen, 2006; Ireland, 2009; Hall et al., 2009; Inagaki, 2009; Jawadi and Sousa, 2013; Lucas and Nicolini, 2015; Miller et al., 2019) . These results indicate that the singlevalued approach to approximating the welfare cost of in ‡ation presented in previous literature captures only the sample average at each point in time.
The introduction of trend in ‡ation in the model augments the interest semielasticity of money demand debate by enriching the model along the lines of various papers (Hornstein and Wolman, 2005; Amano et al., 2007; Ascari and Ropele, 2007; Kiley, 2007; Ascari and Ropele, 2009; Ascari and Sbordone, 2014) . The rise in trend in ‡ation is one of the primary reasons for the fall in the semi-elasticity due to the rise in the opportunity cost of holding money. By highlighting how high trend in ‡ation a¤ects the semi-elasticity and, therefore, the welfare cost of in ‡ation, the outcomes of our analysis are original and provide several policy recommendations.
Finally, this paper presents an alternative channel by which it is possible to explain the decline in monetary policy e¤ectiveness that was observed in the post-1980s period. Mohsin (2010, 2016) found that in ‡ation has an important permanent e¤ect on the real economy in several ways including consumption, investment, and the current account. Our model, which also incorporates the cashin-advance constraint (CIA), mimics these …ndings since it identi…es trend in ‡ation as a key driver of real e¤ects. However, in our framework, the transmission works through the money demand channel. Boivin and Giannoni (2002) concluded that changes in the monetary policy rule were responsible for the variations that were observed in the impulse responses. Pancrazi and Vukotic (2019) found that the decline in the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy could be attributed to the evolution of labor market properties. Instead, we show that the changes in the household's preferences that were observed may explain a large portion of the decline in the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy in the short-term. These changes are larger for the short-run and decline over the medium-to-long run, a result that converges with the …ndings of Pancrazi (2014) .
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we derive the money demand curve from micro-foundations that include positive trend in ‡ation. Section 3 presents the welfare loss derivations, Section 4 discusses the empirical …ndings, and Section 5 studies the consequences of the money demand curve on the welfare cost of in ‡ation and the resulting reduction in the impact of monetary policy. Section 6 concludes the paper and o¤ers suggestions for future research. Finally, additional supporting results and data are provided in the appendix.
The Theoretical Framework

The Model
The economy consists of a continuum of households, in which the representative household seeks to maximize the following objective function:
where C t is the quantity consumed of the single good, M t =P t denotes holdings of real money balances and serves as a unit of account, and N t denotes worked hours.
We consider the speci…c case in which the period utility is given by the following functional form:
where represents the relative risk aversion of households (or the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution), ' is the inverse of the elasticity of work e¤ort with respect to the real wage (Frisch elasticity), and X t is a composite index of consumption and real balances de…ned as: 8 > > < > > :
with v representing the (inverse) elasticity of substitution between consumption and real balances, and the relative weight of real balances in utility, as presented in Greenwood et al. (1988) .
The composite index X t re ‡ects the non separability property of the utility function 2 given the values of the parameters and v. The parameter captures the "direct e¤ect"of money or the marginal utility of money valued at the steady-state. The parameter v, which represents the (inverse) elasticity of substitution between consumption and real balances, captures the "indirect e¤ect" or the cross-partial derivative of money with consumption.
Changes in these parameters have very general interpretations. A variation in may represent shocks to transactions technology -shocks that change the utility value of money relative to that of consumption expenditures (Koenig, 1990) . Thus, …nancial innovation that reduces transaction costs may be captured by this 2 In non separable utility functions, the marginal utility of consumption directly depends on variations of real money balances and allows us to investigate the e¤ects of variations in real money on the economy (Benchimol, 2016) . In contrast, a separable utility function leaves consumption, and the economy, indi¤erent to variations in real money balances (Benchimol, 2014) . Under a separable utility, the equilibrium values of real variables are determined independently of real money balances and of any implemented monetary policy (Galí, 2015) . parameter . On the other hand, a variation in v captures the preference changes for a household to substitute money and consumption. 3 Maximization of the objective function (Eq. 1) is subject to a sequence of ‡ow budget constraints given by:
where P t is the price of the consumption good, W t is the nominal wage, and B t is the quantity of one-period nominally risk-less discount bonds purchased in period t and maturing in period t + 1. Each bond pays one unit of money at maturity and its price is Q t . T t represents lump-sum additions or subtractions to period income. Let the total …nancial wealth at the end of period t be de…ned as t = B t + M t . The budget constraint (Eq. 4) can then be written compactly as:
Written like Eq. 5, one readily sees the opportunity cost of investing resources in money rather than bonds. The bond price, Q t , determines the interest rate such as i t = ln (Q t ), where i t is the short-term nominal interest rate and is equal to = ln ( ) in the steady-state. We assume a representative …rm whose technology is described by a production function given by:
where A t represents the level of technology and a t = ln (A t ) is assumed to evolve exogenously according to some stochastic process. Maximizing the objective function (Eq. 1) subject to the ‡ow budget constraint (Eq. 5), the necessary …rst-order conditions for any t can be written as:
Motivation for Positive Trend In ‡ation
The relevant equations of the model are log-linearized around a zero-growth and non-zero in ‡ation steady-state, which has been shown to be an important feature of the U.S. economy. 4 In this sense, solving for the non-zero trend in ‡ation may yield a more realistic representation of the structural model. Under the steady-state assumptions, the Euler equation (Eq. 8) can be written as:
where Q represents the steady-state bond prices and the steady-state gross in- ‡ation. This contains straightforward economic intuition. Under zero in ‡ation, = 1, the price of the bond today is exactly equal to the utility weight the household attaches to its return (which is one). The household has no incentive to save or dissave to let their marginal utility di¤er across periods. This return is a¤ected by the gross in ‡ation return.
By using Eq. 8, the steady-state money demand relationship can also be sim-pli…ed such as:
The expression suggests that not only does the ratio of steady-state level of money holdings with respect to consumption decrease in the weight of real balances, trend in ‡ation reduces this ratio as well. This occurs since it raises the opportunity cost of holding money. More broadly, M P C may also be de…ned as the inverse consumption velocity. Assuming that consumption may equal output in steady-state in this model, the parameter m may be interpreted to be the key determinant of the quantitative importance of monetary-non-neutrality in the model (Galí, 2015) .
The choice of the CES MIUF and the relaxation of positive trend in ‡ation a¤ect the ratio of real balances with respect to consumption in the steady-state.
Deriving the linearized system
The …rst order condition (Eq. 7) is log-linearized around the steady-state, and conditions (Eq. 9 and Eq. 10) are imposed to yield the following money demand relationship.
where m t = ln (M t ), p t = ln (P t ), c t = ln (C t ) and i t = ln (Q t ).
Focusing on the parameters, = v( ) may be interpreted as the semi-elasticity of money with respect to interest rates, and the constant, , is found to be equal
The key parameter is a function of , and v, while the constant term is a function of , , v, , and . An increase in trend in ‡ation, , or the elasticity of 4 Ascari and Sbordone (2014) construct a generalized new Keynesian model that accounts for positive trend in ‡ation. In this model an increase in trend in ‡ation is associated with a more volatile and unstable economy and trends to destabilize in ‡ation expectations. Hornstein and Wolman (2005) , Kiley (2007) , and Ascari and Ropele (2009) show that when appropriately considered, positive trend in ‡ation substantially alters the models'structural equations and the determinacy region. Amano et al. (2007) study how the business cycle characteristics of the model (i.e., persistence, correlation, and volatility) vary with trend in ‡ation. Ascari and Ropele (2007) analyze how optimal short-run monetary policy changes with trend in ‡ation. substitution, v, would work to reduce as well as the constant term . The steadystate interest rate positively a¤ects the constant, but does not directly a¤ect the semi-elasticity. Finally, the ratio of real balances to consumption, , reduces the constant term.
How does it connect with the literature?
The unit elasticity of consumption is consistent with the long-run estimate in Lucas (1988) . Considering the special case of zero trend in ‡ation by setting = 1 and ignoring the constant term delivers the money demand curve obtained in Andrés et al. (2002) .
The relationship derived in Eq. 12 can also be written in the following familiar log-linear form (Lucas, 2000) :
Eq. 13 may then be interpreted as linking the log of m t , which represents the ratio of nominal money balances to nominal income, to the level of i t . It is also related to the money demand function postulated by Cagan (1956) :
Setting ln (B) = in Eq. 14 returns the form described in Eq. 13. Connecting this with the …ndings shared by Ireland (2009) , who suggests this functional form to …t better the post-1980s data, suggests that it may be relevant to estimate and pin down the parameters describing Eq. 13 to better approximate the welfare cost of in ‡ation, as well as identify the sources behind these changes.
The remaining equations are linearized to obtain the following expressions:
where Eq. 15 and Eq. 16 are the labor supply curve and the Dynamic Investment-Saving (IS) relationship, respectively. It is further shown in Appendix A.2 that
) m and m refers to the steady-state of the ratio of real money balances with respect to consumption. As shown in Appendix A.3, ! also enters the IS curve, making Eq. 16 sensitive to trend in ‡ation and money.
The sign of (v ) in Eq. 15 and Eq. 16 determines the sign of the e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on labor supply. Trend in ‡ation a¤ects these short-run relationships through entering the term !. Under standard calibration of the model considered in Galí (2015) , high trend in ‡ation seeks to dampen !, thus in ‡uencing the e¤ect of changes in the interest rate on both labor supply and consumption. Moreover, when v > (implying ! > 0) the reduction in real balances induced by an increase in the nominal rate lowers the marginal utility of consumption (for any given c t ), lowering the quantity of labor supplied at any given real wage. In Eq. 16 the anticipation of a nominal rate increase (and, hence, of a decline in real balances), lowers the expected one-period-ahead marginal utility of consumption (for any expected c t+1 ), which induces an increase in current consumption (in order to smooth marginal utility over time).
Since real balances enter this equation directly, they may be relevant in determining in ‡ation and output dynamics. As demonstrated in Appendix A.4, the e¤ect on output can be extracted from the model using the production function (Eq. 6), the money demand curve, the labor supply curve, and the Dynamic IS:
where under standard calibrations of , and ', the e¤ect of interest rates to output depends on !. Since this parameter itself is a convolution of trend in ‡ation and the function of the weight of real balances, as well as the degree of substitutability in the utility function, changes in these parameters a¤ect the degree of interest rate shocks on output. Hence, changes common to those that a¤ect money demand may also in ‡uence the e¤ect of changes in interest rates on output.
The Welfare Loss Function
One consequence of the changes in the money demand function identi…ed in the empirical literature concerns the welfare cost of in ‡ation. The classic approach developed by Bailey (1956) and Friedman (1969) treats real money balances as a consumption good and in ‡ation as a tax on real balances. Lucas (1981) and Fischer (1981) compute such a welfare cost by calculating the area under the money demand curve, obtaining surprisingly low estimates of in ‡ation. However, Lucas (2000) , using the competing money demand speci…cations of Meltzer (1963) , which takes on a log-log form, and Cagan (1956) , which takes on a semi-log form, highlights the fact that these competing money demand speci…cations may have very di¤erent implications for the welfare cost of in ‡ation. Indeed, Ireland (2009) shows that the welfare cost of in ‡ation depends on the speci…cation of the money-demand curve, together with …nding that a semi-log form proposed by Cagan (1956) , which …ts better with post-1980s U.S. data, generates modest departures from Friedman's zero nominal interest rate rule.
In the …rst step, the functional form of the welfare cost function is captured. To do this, we apply the method of Bailey (1956) , and de…ne the welfare cost of in ‡ation as the area under the inverse money demand function -the consumers' surplus -which can be gained by reducing the interest rate from some level i t to zero and then subtracting the seigniorage revenue i t m t to isolate the dead weight loss. De…ning m (i t ) as the estimated function, let (m t ) be the inverse function and de…ne the welfare cost function w (i t ) by: 5
The second integral shows an alternative way of calculating consumer surplus. It can be shown that under the money demand speci…cation (Eq. 13), solving Eq. 18 implies the following welfare function:
It is worth highlighting the similarities between this welfare function (Eq. 19) under money demand (Eq. 13) with the welfare function used by Lucas (2000):
Setting B = e in Eq. 19 yields the Lucas (2000) welfare function in Eq. 20. However, the micro-founded money demand and the welfare function derived in this paper explicitly link the structural parameters of the model with the welfare function by altering both the semi-elasticity and the constant term in the money demand curve.
In the second step, the money demand curve is estimated and combined with the expression similar to Eq. 19 and Eq. 20 to pin down the welfare cost of in ‡ation. To highlight the importance of di¤erent aspects of the money demand function, we apply the well-known speci…cation of the money demand curve (Lucas, 2000; Ireland, 2009 ).
The …rst row in Table 1 pins down welfare at di¤erent levels of in ‡ation and nominal interest rate. The values of and B come from Lucas (2000) based on annual data from 1900 to 1994. His preferred speci…cations set , allows him to pin down an average value of B = 0:3548 so that ln (B) equals the average value of ln (m) + i. This, in turn, allows him to calculate the welfare cost of in ‡ation. However, …xing each combination of fln (m) ; ig yields a di¤erent value of B. In this spirit, Table 1 also lists down the welfare calculations for a 'minimum' and 'maximum'value of B following Lucas's calculations of the constant of money demand. The second panel in Table 1 repeats the same exercise, this time using the values presented in Ireland (2009) , who estimates to be equal to 1:7944 based on quarterly data from 1980 to 2006. Again, setting the elasticity at this benchmark generates both the average as well as the upper and lower bound of B. Table 1 highlights that the di¤erences in the welfare cost of in ‡ation using the same money demand curve may be due to two factors: the value of the semielasticity of money demand, and the constant of regression. Moving from a regime where high elasticity is estimated to one that is low works to reduce the welfare cost of in ‡ation. Intuitively, a lower elasticity implies a steeper money demand curve, therefore, a lower area will represent the welfare cost. However, even with lower elasticity, if the constant of the money demand has increased then this would work to mitigate some of the fall in welfare due to money demand steepening; in this sense, the choice of B matters for the total welfare -a higher B for a given generates a higher welfare loss. (2000) and Ireland (2009). In this sense, the money demand and welfare framework derived in this paper gives a unique micro-founded interpretation to the money-demand curve, and the corresponding welfare function utilized in Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009) . Viewed through the lens of this framework, the potential sources behind the di¤erences in welfare cost obtained in Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009) are distilled. To answer these questions, we delve into the data presented in Appendix B, which allows us to estimate the money demand curve with the intention of unraveling the di¤erences in welfare and pinpointing the factors that may have generated these shifts in the money demand curve.
Estimating the Money Demand Curve
Fixed Coe¢ cients
We estimate the money demand curve using quarterly U.S. data spanning 1959-2008. The beginning of the sample is chosen to coincide with Ireland (2004) , while the end-of-sample dates are chosen to avoid dealing with the Federal Reserve's unconventional monetary policy that began in September 2008.
Following Ireland (2009) and Miller et al. (2019) , the money-income ratio is measured by dividing the Cynamon et al. (2006) sweep-adjusted M1 money stock (M1RS aggregate) by nominal GDP, the three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate, which serves as the measure of i and matches the risk-free rate, nominally-denominated bonds that serve as an alternative store of value in theoretical models of money demand. 6 We utilize both static ordinary least squares (SOLS) and dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) estimates of the parameters of the money demand, 7 linking ln (m) and i. Therefore, each of the parameter estimates in the following tables comes from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of ln (m) on a constant, the level of the nominal interest rate i, and leads and lags of i, the quarter-to-quarter change in the nominal interest rate computed using the Newey and West (1987) estimator of the regression error variance for various values of the lag truncation parameter q. 89 ln (m) = i
Focusing …rst on the value of , the SOLS and the DOLS estimates are close to each other and suggest a value between 3:4542 (SOLS) and 3:8561 (DOLS with four lags and leads), con…rming that the estimated interest elasticity of money demand di¤ers signi…cantly from zero. However, this number is estimated to be higher than that of Ireland (2009) , who …nds it to be in the 1:8 1:9 range and, at the same time, is signi…cantly smaller in absolute value than the Lucas (2000) setting of 7. The constant of regression is estimated to be higher than that estimated in both Ireland innovation in the economy in the form of new transactions technology or the introduction of alternative new monetary assets may be incorporated into the construction of the index number, ensuring that the money demand function remains stable even during periods of high …nancial innovation -see, e.g. Belongia (1996) for money demand stability, and further evidence from 11 countries by Belongia and Binner (2000) . Furthermore, Belongia and Ireland (2019) argues that the identi…cation of stable money demand functions -when estimated with Divisia quantity data and their user cost duals -is consistent with the idea that instability reported since the early 1990s may be more closely associated with measurement error than shifts in the underlying economic relationships themselves. Belongia and Ireland (2019) identify a stable money demand function over a period that includes the …nancial innovations of the 1980s and continues through the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and Great Recession, suggesting that a properly-measured aggregate quantity of money can play a role in the conduct of monetary policy. More broadly, Qureshi (2016 Qureshi ( , 2018 argue that using M1 and M3, as compared to M2, may be more useful for policy purposes. Not only do their results present an alternative framework to explain the historical actions of the Fed, but the subsequent analysis suggests that the bias against the inclusion of money in mainstream macroeconomic models may be due to an overreliance on an incorrect aggregate. 7 Roughly similar results were obtained using alternative techniques such as VECM. These results are available upon request. 8 DOLS has a number of advantages (Stock and Watson, 1993; Hamilton, 1994) . First, and under the assumption of co-integration in the relationships, the DOLS estimates are asymptotically e¢ cient and asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood estimates obtained, for example, through the method proposed by Johansen (1988) . Second, adding leads and lags of i to the estimated equations controls for possible correlation between the interest rate and the residual from the co-integrating relationship, linking ln (m) and i. Finally, the conventional Wald test statistics formed from these DOLS estimates have conventional normal or chi-squared asymptotic distributions, making it possible to draw familiar comparisons between the parameter estimates and their standard errors. 9 Since we evaluate welfare costs as a percentage of GDP, we need to formally test for the assumption of unitary income elasticity and, when evidence in its favor is found, impose it and estimate long-run money demand equations, where the natural logarithm of the money-income ratio depends on the nominal interest rate given to our micro-founded speci…cation. Perhaps this is a restriction, but the unit elasticity of consumption is imposed by the theoretical derivation of the money demand curve -a result consistent with the long-run estimate in Lucas (1988) . In any case, we directly estimate the unit elasticity and we …nd results consistent with those found in Ireland (2009), i.e. approximately equal to unity.
(2009) and Lucas (2000) . As the static and dynamic OLS estimates look quite similar, so do the implied welfare costs. 10 Assuming, as before, that the steady-state real interest rate equals three percent, so that r = 0:03 corresponds to zero in ‡ation, r = 0:05 corresponds to two percent annual in ‡ation, r = 0:07 corresponds to four percent annual in ‡ation and r = 0:13 corresponds to ten percent annual in ‡ation. Therefore, the regression coe¢ cients put the welfare cost of pursuing a policy of price stability as opposed to the Friedman (1969) rule at less than 0:0292 percent of income, the cost of two percent in ‡ation at less than 0:0776 percent of income, the cost of four percent in ‡ation at less than 0:1455 percent of income, and the cost of ten percent in ‡ation at less than 0:4389 percent of income. Interestingly, Table 2 also provides estimates of the cost of ten percent in ‡ation compared to price stability, w (0:13) w (0:03), at approximately 0:4097 percent of income. These numbers are still larger than the Fischer (1981) estimate of 0:30 percent of income, and the Ireland (2009) estimate of 0:20 percent of income, but close to the Lucas (1981) estimate of 0.45 percent of income. 11 Before delving into sub-sample estimates, we extract the values of trend in ‡ation, steady-state interest and the subjective rate of time preference parameter from the data, then use the functional forms derived earlier to extract values for the two parameters in the utility function, v and . Table 3 summarizes the parameters obtained under the money demand estimates described in Table 2 . In ‡ation during the sample is …xed at 3:5674 percent, which corresponds to 1:0089 in gross terms. The sample average for the interest rate is found to be 5:430 percent. These numbers permit the extraction of the elasticity (v) and the weight of real balances versus consumption in the utility function, which are 9:8968 and 0, respectively. While we …nd a moderate degree of inter-temporal elasticity, rejecting the restrictive CES version to represent utility, the evidence presents little evidence of real balances a¤ecting the utility function for the entire time period of the benchmark estimates In ‡ation ( ) Interest ( ) Elasticity (v) Weight ( ) 0:99 1:0089 0:0543 16:2189 0:0000 Looking in detail at the elasticity of substitution, these numbers connect with Holman (1998) who …nd that the estimated exponent of the CES characterizations is statistically di¤erent from zero in the nested-CES case, as well as with Galí (2015) who propose this number to be "reasonably large". Second, given that v 6 = 1, the results imply that utility is not separable in either consumption or money. Third, the share of real balances is in stark contrast to the …ndings of Holman (1998), Finn et al. (1990) and Poterba and Rotemberg (1987) who …nd evidence of real balances in utility. Notice that this could be due to a number of reasons, such as due to the time period under question, or the type of money aggregate used. Indeed, variation in may also represent shocks in transactions technology -shocks that change the utility value of money relative to that of consumption expenditures (Koenig, 1990) , which are potentially time-varying. To accommodate these changes, we focus on estimating the money demand curve around key break-dates.
Split-Sample Estimates
To deal with potential instabilities, we rely on a split-sample approach to estimate the money demand function. We rely on static and dynamic OLS techniques to estimate this money demand function for the two periods: 1959: I-1979 :IV and 1980 :I-2008 The break in 1980 is chosen to coincide with both the arrival of Paul Volcker at the Federal Reserve Board and the implementation of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, which are often identi…ed as key events marking the start of a new chapter in U.S. monetary history. As before, the end date of 2008:II is chosen to coincide with the collapse of the Lehman Brothers and the beginning of unconventional policy by the Fed. 13 The detailed results are available in Appendix C. Table 4 outlines the key parameters of semi-elasticity and the constant -obtained under OLS estimates. It is immediately clear from these numbers that a split-sample approach around the break-date highlights a large shift in the value of the semi-elasticity, re ‡ecting a ‡attening of the money-demand curve. In this sense, our results …nd little disagreement with the estimate suggested by Ireland (2009) . However, pre-1979 estimates paint a completely di¤erent picture because elasticity is found to be close to the estimates suggested by Lucas (2000) . Furthermore, a clear and statistically signi…cant shift in the constant term is also found as the upper and lower bounds of the estimates are tightly estimated.
Parameters
Pre Table 4 also summarizes the parameters obtained under the money demand estimates. In ‡ation and interest rates are pinned down from the data and vary across the sample, which is uncontroversial in the literature. These numbers permit the extraction of the elasticity (v) and the weight of real balances versus consumption in the utility function. A large variation in these numbers between the two time periods is also observed. There are signi…cant changes in the elasticity of money demand, a result which is consistent with the …ndings of Ireland (2009), but di¤erent from those found in Miller et al. (2019) . 14 First, the elasticity of substitution between consumption and real balances between the two periods is said to have fallen. Second, the share of real balances in utility implies a comparable role for money balances in the …rst half and a negligible role in the second. Indeed, estimates of in the …rst half present values close to those found in Holman (1998), Finn et al. (1990) and Poterba and Rotemberg (1987) . Holman (1998) …nd liquidity services to have the largest role in the nested-CES case (ranging from 0:0242 to 0:0319); Finn et al. (1990) …nd that real balances comprise less than 10 percent of total expenditures; while Poterba and Rotemberg (1987) estimate that the share of expenditures on consumption is between 0:961 and 0:969. Thus, while our estimates reveal a slightly smaller role for liquidity services in the …rst half of the sample, the non-zero values do con…rm previous …ndings.
Moreover, since real balances enter directly the dynamic IS, they may be relevant in determining in ‡ation and output dynamics during the …rst half of the sample, complementing the …ndings of Castelnuovo (2012) .
Applications
Explaining Changes in the Welfare Cost of In ‡ation
Combining the estimates of semi-elasticity in Section 4.2 with the welfare cost function derived in Section 3, Table 5 looks at the welfare cost of in ‡ation. Plus, the counterfactual welfare cost is also illustrated when the constant and semi-elasticity terms in the money demand curve are varied. Table 5 suggests that both the semi-elasticity of interest and the constant term are estimated to be higher during the pre-1979 period when compared to their post-1980 counterparts. The values for the welfare cost of in ‡ation are not too far o¤ from those implied in Dotsey and Ireland (1996) for the pre-1979 sample. The welfare cost of pursuing a policy of price stability as opposed to the Friedman (1969) rule at less than 0:0857 percent of income, the cost of two percent in ‡ation at less than 0:2159 percent of income, the cost of four percent in ‡ation at less than 0.3843 percent of income, and the cost of ten percent in ‡ation at less than 1:0002 percent of income. Table 5 also provides estimates of the cost of ten percent in ‡ation compared to price stability, w (0:13) w (0:03), which is approximately 0:9145 percent of income -numbers that are still larger than the Fischer (1981) estimate of 0:30 percent of income, and the Ireland (2009) estimate of 0:20 percent, and even the Lucas (1981) estimate of 0:45 percent of income. The di¤erences with Lucas (1981) and Lucas (2000) arise primarily due to our estimate of the constant term in the money demand curve.
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4% 10% in ‡ation in ‡ation in ‡ation in ‡ation m t = i t w (0:03) w , pre-1979 and post-1980 . It further presents the welfare cost of in ‡ation using counterfactual values of the underlying parameters driving the semi-elasticity and constant of the money demand curve.
A startlingly di¤erent picture emerges for the post-1980 sample, where the welfare cost of pursuing a policy of price stability as opposed to the Friedman (1969) rule reads at less than 0:0109 percent of income, the cost of two percent in ‡ation at less than 0:0298 percent of income, the cost of four percent in ‡ation at less than 0:0572 percent of income, and the cost of ten percent in ‡ation at less than 0:1855 percent of income. Interestingly, Table 5 also provides estimates of the cost of ten percent in ‡ation compared to price stability, w (0:13) w (0:03), which is approximately 0:1746 percent of income, numbers that are smaller than the Fischer (1981) estimate of 0:30 percent of income, and close to the Ireland (2009) estimate of 0:20 percent. Broadly, Table 5 points to large changes in welfare across the two time periods.
Looking at counterfactual evidence, it is clear from Table 5 that not only switching the elasticity term but also the switch in the constant term has large implications on the welfare cost of in ‡ation. Focusing …rst on the pre-1979 time-period, switching the elasticity parameter contributes to an almost 50% fall in welfare, while switching the constant terms generates a fall of approximately 30%. In contrast, opposing results emerge for the post-1980 period. The underlying factors of the shifts in the money demand curve reveal the true sources of the changes in the welfare cost of in ‡ation. The …rst block in Table 5 pinpoints the welfare cost of in ‡ation in the pre-1979 sample, setting each of the underlying sources at post-1980 values. First, lower in ‡ation works to increase both the elasticity and the constant parameter, increasing the welfare cost of in ‡ation. Second, a shift in the elasticity of substitution generates a rise in the constant term but a fall in the semi-elasticity of interest term. A switch in steady-state interest rates generates a larger constant term and, therefore, a larger loss in welfare. Considering the share of real balances extracted in the post-1980s sample to calculate the constant term for the pre-1979 sample, we …nd that this generates a large fall in welfare despite being roughly the same elasticity of interest rates. Our calculations suggest that the combined e¤ect of a reduction in the weight of real balances and the elasticity of substitution between real balances and consumption work to reduce the welfare cost in the …rst sample.
Moving onto the second half of the sample reveals similar insights. Replacing a higher value of trend in ‡ation or a lower value of the steady-state interest rate works to reduce the semi-elasticity but increases the constant term, generating a larger fall in in ‡ation. The elasticity of substitution generates a larger but a lower value of the constant. Finally, considering the share of real balances extracted in the pre-1979 sample to calculate the constant term for the post-1980 sample generates a large rise in welfare, this roughly matching the welfare costs observed in the …rst half of the sample.
What might justify these results? First, the evidence in favor of the time dependence of the deep parameters may be interpreted as time-varying preferences by American households, or as evidence in favor of breaks due to …nancial innovation, as argued by Castelnuovo (2012) . Indeed, Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) enumerate important elements of this transformation, such as the passing of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act in 1980 -particularly the demise of regulation Q, and the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (Hendershott, 1992; Dynan et al., 2006; Campbell and Hercowitz, 2009 ). These changes allowed households unprecedented access to external …nancing (Campbell and Hercowitz, 2009) , which was further facilitated by the emergence of secondary mortgage markets (Peek and Wilcox, 2006; McCarthy and Peach, 2002) . Moreover, access to external …nancing was enhanced by the development of a market for bonds with below-investment grade ratings (Gertler and Lown, 1999) , as well as a decline in the cost of new equity issuances (Jermann and Quadrini, 2006) .
The irrelevance of more traditional money aggregates and the emergence of complementary sources of …nance for households may imply a weakening of the semi-elasticity of interest. This has perhaps worked to reduce the welfare cost of in ‡ation. Looking at this argument another way, money holdings yield direct utility in the model in a standard framework. Since the importance of real balances seems to decline in the second half of the sample, so does their contribution to welfare. Interest Rates 1 9 5 9 . I -1 9 7 4 : I V 1 9 6 3 . I -1 9 7 8 : I V 1 9 6 7 . I -1 9 8 2 : I V 1 9 7 1 . I -1 9 8 6 : I V 1 9 7 5 . I -1 9 9 0 : I V 1 9 7 9 . I -1 9 9 4 : I V 1 9 8 3 . I -1 9 9 8 : I V 1 9 8 7 . I -2 0 0 2 : I V 1 9 9 1 . I -2 0 0 6 : I V 10 20 30
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Recursive Estimates
It has been documented by several authors that post-WWII U.S. macroeconomic relationships may be characterized by instabilities that might not even be captured using a single split-sample approach. The time-varying aspect of the semi-elasticity has also been discussed in the literature. 15 The evolution of …nancial services, in particular, may be characterized by a gradual change in the behavior of households. Accounting for the possibly evolving role played by the underlying factors is, therefore, of crucial importance for achieving correct identi…cation of the underlying drivers of the changes in money demand. Following Castelnuovo (2012) , we tackle this issue by recursively estimating the money demand curve with OLS techniques. We estimate the evolution of the parameters constructed by employing seven rolling windows of 16-year constant length. We then extract the underlying structural parameters based on time-varying estimates of semi-elasticity of interest, which are pictured in Fig. 1 .
It is apparent from Fig. 1 that changes in the semi-elasticity and the constant term in the money demand function occurred gradually, starting well before the 1980s. These terms are seen declining as the sample moves through observations conditioned to the 1970s -a period accompanied by rising interest rates and in ‡ation -and a gradually-rising elasticity of substitution between consumption and real balances. Fig. 1 suggests two large shifts in the semi-elasticity of interest rates, instead of occurring around the commonly considered split-sample break. The decline in semi-elasticity occurs when moving from the window dated 1963:I-1978:IV to the 1967:I-1982:IV. The semi-elasticity of interest is observed to decline substantially from around 5:8715 to 3:9536 during this period. However, the underlying utility parameters display remarkable stability during this period. Looking closely, this change in semi-elasticity is attributed to the rise in trend in ‡ation from 4.7994 to 6.194 percent. A smaller change in the constant is observed that, given the stability of the underlying utility parameters, is attributed to the rise in interest rates.
The second sharp fall in the semi-elasticity of interest rates is observed when moving from the window 1971: I-1986 I- :IV to 1975 I- :I-1990 :IV. The semi-elasticity of interest declines substantially from around 3:1337 to 1:8716 during this period. However, in this case, both in ‡ation and interest rates, while not constant, display remarkable stability. From the data, in ‡ation is averaged at around 5 percent, while interest rates rise only marginally from 7:9401 to 8:2085. In this case, a sharper change is observed in the elasticity of substitution between consumption and real balances, which almost doubles from 12:8699 to 23:2613. The share in real balances in the utility function declines to zero.
On closer inspection, movements in semi-elasticity of interest toward the latter half of the sample could be attributed to changes in the elasticity of substitution between consumption and real balances. While the elasticity of substitution works to reduce the semi-elasticity of interest rates, the decline in the share of real balances in utility is the key factor behind the decline in the constant term. One possible explanation for this factor may lie in …nancial innovation increases during this period. The availability of alternative sources of payments may cause the share of real balances in utility to fall, as households have a lower reliance on this particular aggregate. Because households now hold fewer real balances, the degree of substitutability for those lower levels of real balances falls. With households now holding a lesser share, they are less inclined to substitute those real balances. For the limited amount of real balances held that are more valuable than before, the opportunity cost rises, which a¤ects the welfare cost of in ‡ation. Table 6 outlines the results from the rolling window estimates, tabulating the values of in ‡ation, interest rates, semi-elasticity, and the share of real balances, as well as the welfare cost of in ‡ation observed.
Assuming, as before, that the steady-state real interest rate equals three percent so that r = 0:03 corresponds to zero in ‡ation, r = 0:05 corresponds to two percent annual in ‡ation, r = 0:07 corresponds to four percent annual in ‡ation and r = 0:13 corresponds to ten percent annual in ‡ation, this means that Table 6 con…rms the gradual fall in welfare cost of in ‡ation at di¤erent levels of interest rates and in ‡ation. Indeed, the welfare cost is found to be declining gradually. Corresponding to the decline is the semi-elasticity of interest rates, which occurs moderately due [1959 :I -1974 :IV, 1963 :I -1978 :IV, ..., 1990 :I -2006 :IV].
to the constant, while the second decline is due to a combined change in semielasticity of interest and the constant term. According to our results, the …rst change is primarily attributed to a rise in trend in ‡ation and interest rates, while the second shift is attributed to changes in the utility function -in particular to the changes in the elasticity of substitution between consumption and real balances, and to the fall of the share of real balances by households. Table 6 also provides estimates of the cost of ten percent in ‡ation compared to price stability, w (0:13) w (0:03) at various junctures in time, starting from approximately 0:9230 in the …rst window and declining to almost 0:1941. The numbers obtained for each data sample encompass the con ‡icting …ndings in the previous literature. At the same time, these results indicate that the single-valued approach to approximate the welfare cost of in ‡ation in previous literature captures only the sample average at each point in time.
When combined, our results suggest that the entire shift in money demand could be attributed to the evolution of trend in ‡ation, interest rates, and changes in the utility function. This o¤ers an alternative explanation for the changes observed in the traditional money demand relationship.
Assessing Changes in the Monetary Transmission Mechanism
As documented earlier, several authors have presented evidence of large changes that took place in the U.S. economy during the 1980s. For example, Boivin and Giannoni (2002) test whether the monetary transmission mechanism has changed. They examine whether the macroeconomic e¤ects of monetary policy shocks in the U.S. were di¤erent in the 1980s and 1990s relative to the 1960s and 1970s. They conclude that changes in the monetary policy rule are responsible for the change in the impulse response of in ‡ation and output. Pancrazi and Vukotic (2019) test whether conventional monetary policy instruments maintained the same e¤ectiveness to accommodate any undesirable e¤ects of shocks throughout the postwar period. They too …nd that the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy (its ability to counteract undesired shocks) has declined, though they identify the changed properties of the labor market as proving the key contribution to this decline. Theoretical results suggest that changes common to those that a¤ect money demand may also in ‡uence the e¤ect of changes in interest rates on output (Section 2). Intuitively, since real balances, the elasticity of substitution between consumption and real balances in the utility function, and trend in ‡ation enter the IS equation, changes in these parameters may a¤ect the linkages between interest rates on output.
To test these changes from the data, we begin by documenting evidence regarding changes in the monetary transmission mechanism for the U.S., replicating, in essence, the …ndings of Boivin and Giannoni (2002) . The baseline empirical model of the economy is a VAR in variables describing the economy (Z t ) as well as monetary policy (R t ):
The structural block is described by the vector Z t = [y t ; t ] 0 , of output gap (y t ) and the annualized in ‡ation rate ( t ). The policy instrument R t is assumed to be the 3-month treasuring bill used earlier. 16 To be consistent with recent VAR analyses, we assume that the economy (Z t ) responds only with a lag to changes in the policy instrument (R t ). The recursive VAR follows closely the notation used in Boivin (2006) and is expressed as:
In particular, we assess the changes in the e¤ects of monetary policy by comparing impulse response functions of the output gap, in ‡ation, and the Fed funds rate to a monetary policy shock using the VAR estimated over two di¤erent subsamples. 17 16 Several clari…cations are in order. First, we do not include a commodity price measure since it is not formally justi…ed by the theoretical model, but is only included to limit the extent of the price puzzle in this VAR, as discussed in Boivin (2006) . Moreover, Christiano et al. (1996) show that, while including di¤erent indices of price commodity limits the price puzzle, it is not justi…ed theoretically. Second, in each series, our results remain robust for including the output gap instead of output growth. 17 Based on evidence listed earlier regarding the conduct of monetary policy, we base our results on the following subsamples: sample 1 corresponding to 1959:I-1979:IV and sample 2 corresponding to 1980:I-2008:II. While Boivin (2006) …nd slightly di¤erent results when they use 1984 as the break-point, Stock and Watson (2003) show that this break date is very imprecisely estimated. They …nd con…dence intervals for the break date that essentially encompass all of the 1980s, hence justifying our choice for the break-date. Fig. 2 displays the impulse response functions for an unexpected unit increase in the 3-month T-bill rate from the identi…ed VAR, summarizing the speci…c changes in the transmission mechanism discussed in Boivin and Giannoni (2002) and Pancrazi and Vukotic (2019) . It is clear that a unit change in interest rates seems to have had a dissimilar initial impact on in ‡ation and output gap, and is conditional on the type of time period analyzed.
Similar to Boivin and Giannoni (2002) , we also con…rm these changes by comparing the di¤erences in the means of the response to interest rates. Both output and in ‡ation display statistically signi…cant di¤erences; the p-values of output and in ‡ation -of 0:0000 and 0:0166, respectively -con…rm the statistically signi…cant changes in the transmission mechanism, despite roughly the same impact on interest rates (p-value of 0:8817) across the two time-periods.
To quantify these changes, we construct a measure of the impact elasticity, denoted by M P as:
where the variablesỹ and{ are the impulse response of a one-unit policy innovation and j is the horizon of the period analyzed. Thus, the combined e¤ect of a unit change in interest rates on output is the sum of the e¤ect of output divided by interest rates at each point in time. Taking the average of this number yields a measure of the impact elasticity of monetary policy on output. The measure of elasticity is similar to that constructed by Pancrazi and Vukotic (2019) . The change in M P;t conditioned on the two periods is measured as: Table 7 summarizes the impact elasticity for di¤erent time-horizons. For the benchmark case, where the horizon -represented here in quarters -is relatively shorter, the value of M P is equal to 1:22. This implies that the e¤ect on output for the unit monetary policy shock has declined by almost 18% in the second half of the sample. 18 Values vary for the horizon considered. For the 12-period sample, as an example, this value rises to approximately 1:70, or a 42% reduction in the e¤ect on output for the unit monetary policy shock. Although lower over the medium-term, the impact elasticity remains the same. These changes are larger for the short-run, and seem to decline over the medium-to-long-run; a result that seems to converge with the …ndings of Pancrazi (2014) who …nds little evidence of these changes in the medium-term.
Horizon (j)
Impact Elasticity Percentage Pre-1979 Post-1980 substitution between consumption and real balances a¤ect the key parameters that determine the degree of monetary neutrality, as shown in the theoretical model. Due to …nancial innovation, or the availability of alternative sources of payments, the share of real balances in utility falls as households have a lower reliance on this particular aggregate. Because households now hold fewer real balances, the degree of substitutability for those lower levels of real balances falls. For the lesser share of real balances households now hold, they become less inclined to substitute them. Since these variables enter the IS equation, changes in these parameters may a¤ect linkages between interest rates on output.
We calculate the e¤ect on output to changes in interest rate using the theoretical model. This can be summarized from the Dynamic IS relationship presented in Eq. 16. Table 8 presents values of m , , , and the value of = !(1 ) (1 )+'+ , which measures the degree of monetary neutrality implied by the model. It is immediately clear, comparing the values of pre 1979 and post 1980 , that the transmission mechanism has changed. Indeed, M P = M P;pre 1979 M P;post 1980 , is estimated to be around 1:58, lying within the intervals for the VAR at di¤erent horizons, and roughly matching the average impact-elasticity of monetary policy found earlier (1:7004).
The framework suggests that the changes in the utility function, perhaps due to …nancial innovation, may not only explain changes in the money demand relationships and the welfare cost of in ‡ation but also a large part of the decline in monetary policy e¤ectiveness. 19
Conclusion
This paper empirically documents and assesses the causes and consequences of the evolving relationship between interest rates and money. Using a CES MIUF spec-i…cation, we show that the interest semi-elasticity of money demand is a function of the household's preferences to hold real balances and substitute consumption and real balances, and trend in ‡ation. Our results give rise to a general microfounded expression for the welfare cost of in ‡ation. Our time-varying estimates based on quarterly U.S. data revealed that there was a gradual fall in the interest semi-elasticity of money demand and the welfare cost of in ‡ation during the period spanning 1959 to 2006. The interest elasticity of money demand fell by approximately one-third during the 1970s due to high trend in ‡ation, and further fell during the 1980s due to the changing household preferences that emerged in response to …nancial innovation. These developments substantially reduced the welfare cost of in ‡ation. We further showed that the changes in the household's preferences explained a large part of the decline in the monetary policy e¤ectiveness that was observed in the post-1980 era. This paper adds to the …ndings of previous studies in several ways. Our microfounded interpretation of the interest semi-elasticity of money demand and the welfare cost of in ‡ation generates clear insights into the structural factors that underpinned the changes observed in the periods of interest. Finally, the results indicate that households do not separate their preferences with regards to consumption and real money, and that trend in ‡ation, the preference for the present (discount factor), and this nonseparability preference play a similar role. The more trend in ‡ation or the nonseparability coe¢ cient increases, or the more the discount factor decreases, the more monetary neutrality increases. Consequently, as money supply equals its demand at each point of time, monetary neutrality in ‡uences two distinct central bank tools: interest rate decisions and money supply. Monetary neutrality requires high durable in ‡ation, decreased preference for the present, and an increased household's preference to substitute money holdings and consumption. To manage monetary neutrality, the central bank has to decrease trend in ‡ation to reach its in ‡ation target in the long run-and being credible-and to change household's preferences to prefer the present and substitute less between consumption and money holdings.
This policy recommendation is twofold. First, the central bank has to concretely act against high trend in ‡ation through conventional or unconventional monetary policy decisions. Second, the central bank has to in ‡uence household preferences through communication. Doing so, the central bank will manage monetary neutrality in order to avoid instability, increase its credibility, and reinforce its tools.
Appendix
A Derivations
A.1 Money demand Taking Eq. 7 in logs yield m t = 1 v ln (1 exp ( i t )) + 1 v ln 1
By expanding the …rst term on the LHS we obtain:
where exp ( i) = Q is the steady-state bond price at maturity. Imposing the steady-state relationship, Q = , leads to:
which is the expression found in Section 2.3.
A.2 Labor Supply
We proceed with deriving the labor schedule in log-deviations from steady-state:
To eliminate x t , we …rst derive it using the composite consumption-real money balances index:
A …rst-order Taylor approximation of X t around the steady-state leads to:
Plugging this into the labor supply schedule:
which can be simpli…ed to obtain: 
Eq. 11 shows:
Combining Eq. 35 and Eq. 36, we obtain the following expression:
Finally, using the money-demand curve, we obtain:
where ! = (v ) .
A.3 Dynamic IS
The Euler equation is log-linearized to obtain:
Again, eliminating x t we get the following expression:
(40) As before, c t+1 c t [(m t+1 p t+1 ) (m t p t )] is eliminated using the money demand function and imposing the market clearing condition y t = c t :
A.4 E¤ects of Policy Shocks
To obtain Eq. 17, the production function is log linearized to obtain:
Labor market equilibrium is needed to obtain Eq. 17. Log-linearizing the labor demand equation: a t n t = w t p t
which, in combination with the labor supply schedule, gives rise to the following equilibrium condition: y t + 'n t + !i t = a t n t
Plugging in the Eq. 42 to substitute out n t yields the Eq. 17 where = !(1 )
(1 )+'+ captures the elasticity of output with respect to interest rates. is a function of trend in ‡ation, the elasticity of substitution and the share of real balances since these terms enter the convolution in !. 
B Data summary
C DOLS Estimates of the Split-Sample Estimation
Pre-1979
Post-1980 m t = i t SOLS 1:2255 7:5351 1:8920 1:5640 DOLS, p = 1 1:1971 8:1235 1:8226 1:6317 DOLS, p = 2 1:1721 8:6419 1:8201 1:6562 DOLS, p = 3 1:1232 9:6221 1:8215 1:6018 DOLS, p = 4 1:0854 10:335 1:8234 1:5337 
